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Abstract—Defending against distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks in the Internet is a fundamental problem.
However, recent industrial interviews with over 100 security
experts from more than ten industry segments indicate that
DDoS problems have not been fully addressed. The reasons
are twofold. On one hand, many academic proposals that are
provably secure witness little real-world deployment. On the
other hand, the operation model for existing DDoS-prevention
service providers (e.g., Cloudflare, Akamai) is privacy invasive for
large organizations (e.g., government). In this paper, we present
Umbrella, a new DDoS defense mechanism enabling Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) to offer readily deployable and privacy-
preserving DDoS prevention services to their customers. At its
core, Umbrella develops a multi-layered defense architecture to
defend against a wide spectrum of DDoS attacks. In particular,
the flood throttling layer stops amplification-based DDoS attacks;
the congestion resolving layer, aiming to prevent sophisticated
attacks that cannot be easily filtered, enforces congestion ac-
countability to ensure that legitimate flows are guaranteed to
receive their fair shares regardless of attackers’ strategies; and
finally the user-specific layer allows DDoS victims to enforce self-
desired traffic control policies that best satisfy their business
requirements. Based on Linux implementation, we demonstrate
that Umbrella is capable to deal with large scale attacks involving
millions of attack flows, meanwhile imposing negligible packet
processing overhead. Further, our physical testbed experiments
and large scale simulations prove that Umbrella is effective to
mitigate various DDoS attacks.
Index Terms—DDoS Attacks, Privacy-Preserving, ISPs, Imme-
diate Deployability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have been
considered as a serious threat to the availability of Inter-
net. Over the past few decades, both industry and academia
make a considerable effort to address this problem. Academia
have proposed various approaches, ranging from filtering-
based approaches [1]–[6], capability-based approaches [7]–
[10], overlay-based systems [11]–[13], systems based on fu-
ture Internet architectures [14]–[16] and other variance [17]–
[19]. Meanwhile, many large DDoS-protection-as-a-service
providers (e.g., Akamai, CloudFlare), some of which are
unicorns, have played an important role in DDoS prevention.
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These providers massively over-provision data centers for peak
attack traffic loads and then share this capacity across many
customers as needed. When under attack, victims use Domain
Name System (DNS) or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to
redirect traffic to the provider rather than their own networks.
The DDoS-protection-as-a-service provider applies their pro-
prietary techniques to scrub traffic, separating malicious from
benign, and then re-injects only the benign traffic back into
the network to be carried to the victim.
Despite such effort, recent industrial interviews with over
100 security engineers from over ten industry segments that
are vulnerable to DDoS attacks indicate DDoS attacks have
not been fully addressed [20]. First, since most of the aca-
demic proposals incur significant deployment overhead (e.g.,
requiring software/hardware upgrades from a large number of
Autonomous Systems (AS) that are unrelated to the DDoS
victim, changing the client network stack such as inserting
new packet headers), few of them have ever been deployed
in the Internet. Second, existing security-service providers
are not cures for DDoS attacks for all types of customer
segments. In particular, a prerequisite of using their security
services is that a destination site must redirect its network
traffic to these service providers. Cloudflare, for instance, will
terminate all user Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections to
the destination at Cloudflare’s network edge, and then send
back user requests (after applying their secret sauce filtering)
to the destination server using new connections. Although this
operation model is acceptable for small websites (e.g., personal
blogs), it is privacy invasive for some large organizations like
government, hosting companies and medical foundations.
As a result, these organizations have no other choices but
to rely on their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block
attack traffic. Realizing this issue, in this paper, we propose
Umbrella, a new DDoS defense mechanism focusing on en-
abling ISPs to offer readily deployable and privacy-preserving
DDoS prevention services to their customers. The design
of Umbrella is lessoned from real-world DDoS attacks that
intentionally disconnect the victim from the public Internet by
overwhelming the victim’s inter-connecting links with its ISPs.
Thus, Umbrella proposes to protect the victim by allowing
its ISPs to throttle attack traffic, preventing any undesired
traffic from reaching the victim. Compared with previous
approaches requiring Internet-wide AS cooperation, Umbrella
simply needs independent deployment at the victim’s direct
ISPs to provide immediate DDoS defense. Further, unlike
existing security-service providers, an ISP does not need to ter-
minate the victim’s connections. Instead, the ISP still operates
on network layer as usual to completely preserve the victim’s
application layer privacy. Third, Umbrella is lightweight since
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2it requires no software and hardware upgrades at both the
Internet core and clients. Finally, Umbrella is performance
friendly because it is overhead-free during normal scenarios
by staying completely idle and imposes negligible packet
processing overhead during attack mitigation.
In its design, Umbrella develops a novel multi-layered
defense architecture. In the flood throttling layer, Umbrella
defends against the amplification-based attacks that exploit
various network protocols (e.g., Simple Service Discovery
Protocol (SSDP), Network Time Protocol (NTP)) [21]. Al-
though such attacks may involve extremely high volume of
traffic (e.g., hundreds of gigabit per second), they can be
effectively detected via static filters and therefore stopped.
In the congestion resolving layer, Umbrella defends against
more sophisticated attacks in which adversaries may adopt
various strategies. Umbrella brings out a key concept con-
gestion accountability [22] to selectively punish users who
keep injecting packets in case of severe congestive losses.
The congestion resolving layer provides both guaranteed and
elastic bandwidth shares for legitimate flows: (i) regardless of
attackers’ strategies, legitimate users are guaranteed to receive
their fair share of the victim’s bandwidth; (ii) when attackers
fail to execute their optimal strategy, legitimate clients are
able to enjoy more bandwidth shares. The last layer, user-
specific layer, allows the victim to enforce self-interested
traffic policing rules that are most suitable for their business
logic. For instance, if the victim never receives certain type of
traffic, it can inform Umbrella to completely block such traffic
when attacks are detected. Similarly, the victim can instruct
Umbrella to reserve bandwidth for premium clients so that
they will not be affected by DDoS attacks.
In summary, the major contributions of this paper are the
design, implementation and evaluation of Umbrella, a new
DDoS defense approach that enables ISPs to offer readily de-
ployable and privacy-preserving DDoS prevention services to
their downstream customers. The novelties of Umbrella live in
the following two dimensions. First, unlike the vast majority of
academic DDoS prevention proposals which require extensive
Internet core and client network-stack change, Umbrella only
requires lightweight upgrades from business-related entities
(i.e., the potential DDoS victim itself and its direct ISPs),
yielding instant deployability in the current Internet architec-
ture. Second, compared with the existing deployable industrial
DDoS mitigation services, Umbrella, through our novel multi-
layer defense architecture, offers both privacy-preserving and
complete DDoS prevention that can deal with a wide spectrum
of attacks, and meanwhile offer victim-customizable defense.
We implement Umbrella on Linux to study its scalability
and overhead. The result shows that a commodity server can
effectively handle 100 million attackers and introduces merely
∼0.06µs packet processing overhead. Finally, we perform
detailed evaluation on our physical testbed, our flow-level sim-
ulator and the ns3 packet-level simulator [23] to demonstrate
the effectiveness of Umbrella to mitigate DDoS attacks.
II. PROBLEM SPACE AND GOALS
In this section, we discuss Umbrella’s problem space and
its design goals. Completely preventing DDoS attacks is an
extremely large scope. The problem space articulates Um-
brella’s position within this scope. Further, the design goals
of Umbrella are designed based on the industrial interviews in
[20] so that Umbrella indeed offers desirable DDoS prevention
to those large and privacy-sensitive potential victims such as
government and medical infrastructures. We do not however
claim that these goals are universally applicable to all types
of potential victims (for instance, a web blogger may simply
choose CloudFlare to keep her website online).
A. Problem Space
Network-Layer DDoS Mitigation. We position Umbrella as
a network-layer DDoS defense approach to stop undesirable
traffic from reaching and consuming resources of the vic-
tim’s network. Specifically, Umbrella is designed to prevent
attackers from exhausting the bandwidth of the inter-network
link connecting the victim’s network to its ISP so as to keep
the victim “online” even in face of DDoS attacks. Note that
Umbrella should be viewed to be complementary to other
solutions addressing DDoS attacks at other layers (e.g., layer
7 HTTP attacks). Only concerted efforts contributed by these
solutions can potentially provide complete defense against all
types of DDoS attacks.
Adversary Model. We consider strong adversaries that can
compromise both end-hosts and routers. They are able to
launch strategic attacks (e.g., the on-off shrew attack [24]),
launch flash attacks with numerous short flows, adopt ma-
liciously tampered transport protocols (e.g., poisoned TCP
protocols that does not properly adjust rates based on network
congestion), leverage the Tor network to hide their identities,
spoof addresses and recruit vast amounts of bots to launch
large scale DDoS attacks.
Assumptions. Umbrella maintains per-sender state in the
congestion resolving layer, and consequently relies on the
correctness of source addresses. Such correctness can be as-
sured by the more complete adoption of Ingress Filtering [25],
[26] or the source authentication schemes [27], [28]. On our
way to achieve complete spoof elimination1, Umbrella requires
victim’s additional participation to minimize the chance of
source spoofing. In particular, the victim needs to provide a
list of authenticated (i.e., TCP handshakes with these sources
are successfully established) or preferred source IP addresses
(based on the victim’s routine traffic analysis performed in
normal scenarios) so that Umbrella will only maintain per-
sender state for these addresses during attack mitigation.
B. Design Goals
Readily Deployable. One major design goal of Umbrella is to
be immediately deployable in the current Internet architecture.
To this end, the functionality of Umbrella relies only on
independent deployment at the victim’s ISP without further
deployment requirements at remote ASs that are unrelated
with the victim. As illustrated in Fig. 1(c), Umbrella can be
deployed at the upstream of the link connecting the victim’s
1In fact, the Spoofer Project [29] extrapolates that only ∼13.6% of
addresses are spoofable, indicating a tremendous progress.
3Resort remote ASs to filter attack traffic
The victim
The ISP
(a) Filtering-based approaches.
Requiring universal capability deployment 
The victim
The ISP
(b) Capability-based approaches.
The ISP
(c) Umbrella.
Layer One: Flood Throttling
Layer Two: Congestion Resolving
Layer Three: User-specific Polices
(d) Multi-layered defense.
Fig. 1: Part (a) and part (b) show that filtering-based and capability-based approaches are difficult to deploy in the Internet since
they require Internet-wide AS cooperation and facility upgrades. Part (c) shows Umbrella is immediately deployable at the victim’s
ISP. Part (d) details Umbrella’s multi-layered defense.
network and its ISP. In the rest of the paper, we refer to this
link as interdomain link and its bandwidth interdomain band-
width. Note that Umbrella deployed at victim’s ISP cannot
cannot stop DDoS attacks trying to disconnect the victim’s
ISP from its upstream ISPs. However, the victim’s ISP, now
becoming a victim itself, should have motivation to protect
itself by purchasing Umbrella’s protection from its upstream
ISPs. Recursively, DDoS attacks happened at different levels
of the Internet hierarchy can be resolved. The neat idea of
Umbrella is that it never requires cooperation among a wide
range of (unrelated) ASes. Rather, independent deployment is
sufficient and effective.
Privacy-Preserving and Customizable DDoS Prevention:
Another primary design goal of Umbrella is to offer privacy-
preserving and customizable DDoS prevention. On one hand,
Umbrella requires no application connection termination at
ISPs, allowing them to operate at the network layer as usual,
which completely preserves the application-layer privacy of
their customers. One the other hand, Umbrella’s multi-layered
defense enables ISPs to offer customizable DDoS prevention
that is driven by the customer policies.
Lightweight and Performance Friendly: Umbrella’s deploy-
ment is very lightweight: it can be implemented as a software
router at the interdomain link, maintaining at most per-source
state. Our prototype implementation demonstrates that a com-
modity server can effectively scale up to deal with millions of
states. Further, Umbrella is completely idle and transparent to
applications in normal scenarios, introducing zero overhead.
During DDoS attack mitigation, Umbrella’s traffic policing
introduces negligible packet processing overhead comparing
with previous approaches requiring complicated and expensive
operation, such as adding cryptographic capabilities and extra
packet headers [9].
Given these goals, we position Umbrella as a practical
DDoS prevention service, offered by ISPs, that is desirable
by large and privacy-sensitive potential DDoS victims.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
In its design, Umbrella develops a three-layered defense
architecture to stop undesirable traffic. The user-specific layer,
enforcing policies defined by the victim, has priority over
the rest two layers, which operate in parallel. Umbrella is
only active when it notices the features of volumetric DDoS
attacks against the interdomain link (e.g., the link experiences
enduring congestion causing severe packet losses). Umbrella
stops traffic policing and becomes idle when the link restores
its normal state. As part of the user-specific layer, the victim
is free to define specific rules to determine when the traffic
policing should be initiated or terminated.
A. Flood Throttling Layer
Flood throttling layer is designed to stop amplification-
based attacks, in which attackers send numerous requests,
with spoofed source address as the victim’s address, to public
servers serving certain Internet protocols (e.g., Network Time
Protocol, Domain Name System). As a result, the victim
receives extremely high volume of responses, resulting in-
terdomain bandwidth exhaustion and disconnection from its
ISP. Although the attack volumes can as high as around
600Gpbs [21], these attacks are easy to be detected. According
to the analysis in [21], only seven network service protocols
are exploited to launch amplification-based DDoS attacks and
over 87% of them rely on UDP with specific port numbers.
Thus, by installing a set of static filters based on these network
service protocols, Umbrella can effectively throttle these large-
yet-easy-to-catch DDoS attacks.
In the case where the victim does receive traffic for certain
network service protocols that may be exploited to launch
amplification attacks, Umbrella can leverage the Weighted
Fair Queuing technique to minimize the potential affect of
these attacks. For instance, if based on traffic analysis in
normal scenarios, 10% of the victim’s traffic traversing the
interdomain link is NTP (on UDP port 123), then such traffic
should be served in a queue whose normalized weight is
configured as 0.1. The weighted fair queuing ensures that the
victim always has sufficient bandwidth to process other flows
(which are served in separate queues), regardless of how much
NTP traffic is thrown to the victim.
B. Congestion Resolving Layer
The congestion resolving layer is designed to stop subtle
and sophisticated DDoS attacks that rely on numerous seemly
legitimated TCP traffic. The crucial part of the defense is
to enforce congestion accountability [22] so as to punish
attackers who keep injecting vast amounts of traffic in face
of congestive losses. Specifically, in volumetric DDoS attacks,
overloaded routers drop packets from all users regardless of
which users cause the enduring congestion. In other words,
4congestion accountability is not considered while dropping
packets. Consequently, legitimate users that run congestion-
friendly protocol (e.g., TCP) are falsely penalized during the
congestion since it is actually caused by attackers. By enforc-
ing congestion accountability, Umbrella is able to selectively
punish misbehaved flows and therefore stop attack traffic.
Umbrella analyzes each user’s congestion accountability
from the perspective of the goal of network usage. Legitimate
users aim to deliver or receive data via the network. Thus,
when encountering congestion, a legitimate TCP sender tries to
relieve the congestion by reducing its rate because its receiver
cannot decode the data if some packets are lost. Sending more
packets therefore makes no progress on finishing the data
transfer, but it causes more severe congestion. On the contrary,
attackers focus on exhausting network resources and care little
about delivering data. As a result, they consistently generate
traffic to contribute to the congestion regardless of how many
packets have been dropped. Therefore, users who overlook
packet losses and continuously inject packets are accountable
for the enduring congestion happened during DDoS attacks.
To resolve the congestion, Umbrella keeps a rate limiting
window for each user to prevent any user from sending faster
than its rate limiting window. The size of the rate limiting
window is determined by the rate limiting algorithm (§IV-B),
taking input as the users’ sending rates and packet losses. All
information needed to make rate limiting decisions is recorded
in Umbrella’s flow table (§IV-A). The design of the rate
limiting algorithm ensures (i) the more aggressively attackers
behave, the less bandwidth shares they will obtain; (ii) each
legitimate client is guaranteed to receive the per-sender fair
share of the congestion resolving layer’s bandwidth regardless
of attackers’ strategies (note that part of the interdomain
bandwidth may be used in other layers). Further, legitimate
users may obtain more bandwidth than the per-sender fair
share when attackers fail to execute their optimal strategy.
C. The User-specific Layer
The goal of adding the user-specific defense layer is to
provide the flexibility for the victim to enforce self-interested
traffic control policies that are most suitable for their busi-
ness logic, including adopting different fairness metrics from
the Umbrella’s default one (per-sender fairness) and offering
proactive DDoS defense for premium clients so that they
will never be disconnected from the victim. Allowing user-
specific policies differs Umbrella from previous in-network
DDoS prevention mechanisms that force the victim to accept
the single policy proposed by these approaches. Thus Umbrella
creates extra deployment incentives for ISPs by enabling them
to offer customized DDoS defense to consumers.
IV. DESIGN DETAILS
Since the flood throttling layer is straightforward in its
design and the user-specific layer is typically driven by the
victim, we focus on elaborating the congestion resolving layer
in this section. However, we have a full implementation of
Umbrella with all three layers in §V.
f TA WR PR PD LR
64 32 32 32 32 64
Fig. 2: Each field in a flow entry and its corresponding size (bits).
A. Flow Table
Umbrella’s flow table maintains per-sender network usage.
Specifically, all packets sent from the same source are aggre-
gated (and defined) as one coflow2 and the flow table maintains
states for each coflow. As discussed in the Assumptions section
of §II-A, the flow table maintains state only for the set
of source IP addresses explicitly provided by the victim to
prevent adversaries from exhausting table state via spoofed
addresses. Umbrella does not keep states for each individual
TCP flow (identified by its 5-tuple) since the behavior of
one single flow may not reflect the intention of the sender
(malicious or not). For instance, one bot keeps sending new
flows to the victim although previous flows experience severe
losses. Even each individual flow may be a legitimate TCP
flow, the bot is actually acting maliciously. However, if we
interpret its behaviors from the coflow’s perspective, we can
figure out that the bot continuously creates traffic in face of
congestive losses. Thus it is accountable for the congestion and
will be rate limited. In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise
stated, flow and coflow are used interchangeably.
Each flow entry (identified by its source address f ) in the
flow table is composed of a timestamp TA, f ’s rate limiting
window WR, the number of packets PR received from f , the
number of dropped packets PD from f and its packet loss
rate LR. Further, Umbrella maintains WTR , the sum of rate
limiting windows of all flows, shared by all flow entries. These
information is necessary for the rate limiting algorithm.
B. Rate Limiting Algorithm
The rate limiting algorithm is designed to enforce conges-
tion accountability by punishing misbehaved users who keep
sending packets in face of severe congestive losses. By early
dropping the undesirable packets, Umbrella can effectively
prevent bandwidth exhaustion. In its design, the algorithm
executes periodic rate limiting for each flow during DDoS
attacks. Specifically, in each detection period, the number of
packets allowed for each flow (or sender) is limited by its
rate limiting windowWR. TheWR is updated every detection
period according to the flow’s information recorded in the
flow table, such as the flow’s packet loss rate LR and its
transmission rate PR.
1) Populating the flow table: Assume at time ts, a new
flow f is initiated. Umbrella creates a flow entry for f in its
flow table. All fields of the entry are initialized to be zero.
Then Umbrella updates TA as ts, increases PR by one and
sets the initial WR as the pre-defined fair share rate Wfair
(discussed in §IV-C). From then on, Umbrella increases PR
by one for each arrived packet of f until the end of the
current detection period (e.g., the end of the first detection
2The concept of coflow is also introduced in data centers, meaning a group
of flows from the same task [30].
5Algorithm 1: Rate Limiting Algorithm
1 Input:
2 The service queue QC executing the FIFO principle.
3 f ’s entry in the flow table.
4 B: the bandwidth available in the congestion resolving layer.
5 WTR : the sum of all flows’ rate liming windows.
6 System related parameters: the detection period length Dp, the
weight λ for previous packet losses, the packet loss rate threshold
LTh and the per-sender fair share rate Wfair .
7 Output:
8 Updated QC , WTR and the flow entry of f .
9 Flow Initialization:
10 WR =Wfair ;
11 Main Procedure:
12 for each arrived packet P of flow f do
13 PR ← PR + 1 ;
14 if PR >WR then
15 Drop P ; PD ← PD + 1 ;
16 else CongestionQueue(P) ;
17 if P is the first packet in a new detection period then
18 RateLimitingDecision(WR,LR,PR,PD) ;
19 Function: RateLimitingDecision(WR,LR,PR,PD) :
20 recentLoss← PD/PR ;
21 packetLoss← λ · LR + (1− λ) · recentLoss ;
22 WoriginalR ←WR ; LR ← packetLoss ;
23 if packetLoss > LTh and PR >Wfair then WR ←WR/2 ;
24 else WR ← RateLimitingWindow(WR) ;
25 WTR ←WTR +WR −WoriginalR ;
26 Function: CongestionQueue(P) :
27 if the queue QC is full then
28 Drop P ;
29 PD ← PD + 1 ;
30 else Append P to QC ;
31 Function: RateLimitingWindow(WR) :
32 return WRWT
R
· B ;
period). Umbrella uses packet arrival time to detect when it
should start a new detection period for f . Specifically, letting
Dp denote the length of detection period, when received a
packet with arrival time t0>TA+Dp, Umbrella realizes that
this packet is the first one received in the new detection period.
Then Umbrella performs the following updates in order: (i) Set
TA = t0; (ii) Update WR and LR according to the Algorithm
1; (iii) Reset PR and PD as zero.
2) The rate limiting algorithm: At the very high level,
the rate limiting algorithm determines the allowed rate for
each flow based on its congestion accountability. In particular,
the rate limiting windows of congestion-accountable flows
(with both high packet loss rates and high transmission rates)
are significantly reduced. Flows respecting packet losses by
adjusting sending rates accordingly are guaranteed to receive
per-sender fair share of the bandwidth. We adopt such a
fairness metric because it is the optimal one that can be
guaranteed for legitimate users under strategic attacks. The
proof is straightforward: by behaving in the exact same way
as legitimate users, attackers can receive at least per-sender
fair share, meaning that the optimal guaranteed share for a
legitimate user is also the per-sender fair share. However, the
algorithm allows legitimate users to obtain more bandwidth
shares when attackers fail to execute their optimal strategy.
Umbrella performs periodic rate limiting. In each detection
period, Umbrella learns each flow’s transmission rate and
packet loss rate to determine its WR. One flow f ’s transmis-
sion rate is quantified by PR, the number of received packets
from f in the current period. f ’s packets may be dropped
for two reasons: (i) f ’s sending rate exceeds its WR or (ii)
the service queue is full due to congestion. f ’s packet loss
rate LR in the current period is the ratio of dropped packets
to received packets. While making rate limiting decisions,
Umbrella adopts the metric packetLoss, which incorporates
both packet losses in the current period and previous packet
losses. Such a design prevents attackers from hiding their
previous packet losses by stopping transmitting for a while
before sending a new traffic burst (e.g., the on-off shrew
attack [24]). If both packetLoss and PR exceed their pre-
defined thresholds, Umbrella classifies f as a maliciously
behaved flow and reduces its WR by half.
We explain two design details of the rate limiting algorithm.
To begin with, the algorithm cannot make the rate limiting
decision for a fresh flow in its first detection period since
Umbrella has not learned its packet loss rate and sending
rate yet. Thus Umbrella initializes its WR as the pre-defined
per-sender fair share rate Wfair in the first detection period,
preventing attackers from exhausting bandwidth by creating
new flows. Besides Wfair, the algorithm relies on anther
three system related parameters: Dp, λ and LTh. We discuss
the reasoning for parameter settings in §IV-C. Further, the
RateLimitingWindow function returns the allowed bandwidth
for f . We need to convert the bandwidth value into the number
of 1.5KB packets allowed in one detection period, which will
be f ’s updated WR.
We close our algorithm design with the remark concerning
the SYN flooding attack. When a SYN packet’s source address
is matched by one flow entry (meaning the source address
has been authenticated), it will be treated in the same way as
regular packets from the source. Thus sending SYN packets
also consumes attackers’ bandwidth budget. SYN packets with
unverified sources are appended to a queue with bounded
bandwidth (e.g., 5% of B). Thus the spoofed SYN flooding
cannot compromise Umbrella’s defense. Regular packets with
unidentifiable sources in the flow table are denied.
C. Parameter Settings
Dp: The length of detection period should be long enough
for Umbrella to characterize each flow’s behaviors during the
congestion as so to determine its congestion accountability.
In particular, Dp needs to be long enough to allow legitimate
users to adapt to the congestion so as to maintain a very low
packet loss rate. Meanwhile, Umbrella is confident that users
with high packet loss rates during such a long period of time
are misbehaving. Given that TCP adjusts its window every
RTT, Dp should be much longer than typical Internet RTTs
(hundreds of milliseconds based on the CAIDA’s measure-
ment [31]). If Dp is too short, the legitimate flows may fail to
adapt to the congestion quickly enough, resulting in inaccurate
and highly fluctuating loss rates for them. On the contrary, Dp
6cannot be too long to avoid slow reaction to attacks. Balancing
the two factors, 2∼6 seconds are reasonable choices for Dp.
λ: The value of λ represents the weight assigned to one flow’s
previous packet losses. To defend against the on-off shrew
attack [24], Umbrella gives a non-trivial weight to previous
packet losses by setting λ = 0.5. Therefore, once a flow
misbehaves, it will have a bad reputation for a while. In order
to regain reputation, the flow would have to honor congestion
by reducing its sending rate when experienced packet losses.
LTh: The value of LTh should be larger than normal packet
loss rates to avoid false positives. According to the previous
measurements [32], [33], we set LTh = 5%.
Wfair: We define the fair share of each flow asWfair=B/N ,
where N is the number of flows in the flow table.3 Again, the
bandwidth value needs to be converted into the number of
packets. Wfair is updated when new flows are initiated. As
we aggregate all traffic from the same sender as one flow,
Wfair may be updated less frequently than each flow’s WR.
D. Algorithm Analysis
In this section, we prove that the rate limiting algorithm
provides both guaranteed and elastic bandwidth shares for
legitimate users: they are guaranteed to obtain the per-sender
fair share and can potentially obtain more bandwidth shares.
We first state the optimal bandwidth shares attackers can get.
Lemma 1. Given that NL legitimate flows and NA attack
flows share the congestion resolving layer’s bandwidth B,
regardless of attackers’ strategies, the aggregated bandwidth
that can be obtained by attack flows is at most (1+LTh)·NA·BNL+NA .
Proof. Umbrella initializes each flow’s WR as per-sender fair
share rate Wfair. Thus attackers can obtain NA·BNL+NA initial
bandwidth. The rate limiting algorithm allows a maximum
LTh loss rate before further reducing one flow’s rate limiting
window. Thus the optimal strategy for an attack flow is to
strictly comply with Umbrella’s rate limiting by sending no
more than 1+LTh times its rate limiting window. Otherwise,
its bandwidth share will be further reduced. In a hypothetical
situation where attackers are able to know their exact rate
limiters and control their packet losses remotely, they can
obtain at most (1+LTh)·NA·BNL+NA .
Based on the Lemma 1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Each legitimate flow can obtain at least
(1+LTh)·B
NL+NA bandwidth share, given that its transport protocol
can fully utilize the allowed bandwidth.
Proof. As each legitimate flow complies with Umbrella’s rate
limiting, it is guaranteed to receive the per-sender fair share.
However, the per-sender fair share is the lower-bound of its
bandwidth share. When attackers fail to adopt their optimal
strategy (e.g., sending flat rates), their rate limiting windows
are significantly reduced. As a result, legitimate flows’ win-
dows, returned by the RateLimitingWindow function, will be
increased since WTR is reduced. Thus legitimate flows can
receive more bandwidth than the per-sender fair share.
3When Umbrella is activated from the idle state, N can be obtained from
the network monitoring and logging tools such as the NetFlow [34].
Flow table size 1 million 10 million 100 million
Packet processing
overhead (us)
~0.0645 ~0.0646 ~0.0647
Memory usage ~60MB ~600MB ~6GB
Fig. 3: Umbrella’s memory consumption and per-packet process-
ing overhead.
To sum up, Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 spell a dilemma
for attackers: sending aggressively rapidly throttles themselves
to almost zero bandwidth share whereas complying with
Umbrella’s rate limiting makes their attacks in vain.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the implementation and eval-
uation of Umbrella. We first demonstrate that Umbrella is
scalable to deal with DDoS attacks involving millions of attack
flows and meanwhile introduces negligible packet processing
overhead. Then we implement all three layers of Umbrella’s
defense on our physical testbed to evaluate Umbrella’s per-
formance. Further, we add detailed simulations to prove that
Umbrella is effective to mitigate large scale DDoS attacks.
A. Overhead and Scalability Analysis
The flood throttling layer can be implemented as weighted
fair queuing. Thus it introduces almost zero overhead since
Umbrella does not maintain any extra states. The overhead of
user-specific layer depends on specific policies. To learn the
overhead of Umbrella’s congestion resolving layer (e.g., per-
packet processing overhead and memory consumption), we
implement Umbrella’s rate limiting logic on a Dell PowerEdge
R320 server shipped with an 8-core Intel E5-1410 2.8GHz
CPU and 24GB memory. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the total
size of a single flow entry is 24 bytes. Thus, even when
Umbrella maintains a flow table with 100 million flows, the
memory consumption is just a few gigabytes, which can be
easily supported by commodity servers. We show both the
memory consumption and per-packet processing overhead for
three table sizes (1, 10 and 100 million entries) in Figure 3.
For the largest table size, the memory consumption is
around 6GB,4 indicating that memory will not become the
bottleneck of Umbrella’s implementation. Further, the per-
packet processing overhead remains almost the same when
the number of flow entries increases from 1 million to 100
million. Thus Umbrella can effectively scale up to deal with
DDoS attacks involving millions of attack flows. Moreover, the
∼0.06µs per-packet processing overhead is negligible even for
the 10Gbps Ethernet with around 1.2µs per-packet processing
time. Thus the victim can still enjoy high speed Ethernet after
deploying Umbrella. Note that the implementation of Um-
brella’s rate limiting algorithm may be optimized according
to the system hardware to further reduce the overhead.
4Note that the memory usage for 100 million flow entries is not exactly
2.4GB since we adopt the map data structure to implement the flow table,
resulting in additional memory consumption.
7(a) Servers.
Victim
Umbrella
Sender
(b) Testbed topology.
Fig. 4: The prototype of Umbrella on our testbed.
B. Testbed Experiments
We implement a prototype of Umbrella on our testbed
consisting 9 servers, illustrated in Fig. 4. Each server is
the same Dell PowerEdge R320 used to learn Umbrella’s
overhead (§V-A). The server is running Debian 6.0-64bit with
Linux 2.6.38.3 kernel and is installed a Broadcom BCM5719
NetXtreme Gigabit Ethernet NIC. We organize the servers into
7 senders (either attackers or legitimate users), one software
router implementing Umbrella’s three-layered defense and
one victim, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b). Thus the interdomain
bandwidth in the testbed is 1Gbps.
The flood throttling layer is implemented as a weighted
fair queuing module at the output port of the software router.
The module serves TCP flows and UDP flows in two separate
queues with different weights. The normalized weight for TCP
flows’ queue is 0.9 whereas UDP flows’ queue weight is 0.1
(again the victim can overwrite the setting). Each queue has
its own dedicated buffer since UDP flows will consume all
buffers when competing with TCP flows, resulting in almost
zero throughput for TCP traffic. With the protection of the
flood throttling layer, TCP flows with sufficient traffic demand
can obtain 900Mbps share of the interdomain link, regardless
of how much UDP traffic is thrown to the victim.
The congestion resolving layer is composed of a set of rate
limiters. Each rate limiter is implemented via the Hierarchical
Token Bucket (HTB) of the Linux’s Traffic Control [35]. The
bandwidth of each rate limiter is each flow’s WR, determined
by Umbrella’s rate limiting algorithm, to ensure no flow can
send faster than itsWR. We set Dp=5s in the implementation.
In our prototype, we implement one representative traffic
policing rule for the user-specific layer: the victim reserves
bandwidth for premium clients so that they will not be affected
by DDoS attacks. Such bandwidth guarantee is achieved by
the weighted fair queuing module assigning one dedicated
queue to premium clients. We did not limit common clients’
rates to ensure bandwidth shares for premium clients because
otherwise the unused bandwidth guarantee is wasted. On the
contrary, weighted fair queuing is work-conserving, allowing
common clients to grab leftover bandwidth from premium
clients. Thus the final queuing module contains three queues.
We perform three experiments on our testbed to evaluate
Umbrella’s defense, detailed as follows.
Layer-one defense: In this experiment, 6 senders, each
sending 1Gbps UDP traffic towards the victim, emulate the
amplification-based DDoS attacks in which the total volume
of attack traffic is 6× the interdomain bandwidth. The 7th
sender sends TCP traffic to represent legitimate clients. As
real-life interdomain link often has overprovisioning to absorb
traffic bursts, we set TCP flows’ demand as 700Mbps (70% of
the total interdomain bandwidth). We present our experiment
results in form of sequential events, illustrated in Fig. 5(a).
At t = 0s, the victim is hammered by DDoS attacks, causing
complete denial of service to legitimate clients. Umbrella’s
layer-one defense is initiated at t = 4s to provide (almost)
immediate DDoS prevention. Legitimate clients’ bandwidth
shares grow rapidly to accommodate their traffic demand.
Due to the work-conservation of weighted fair queuing, attack
traffic consumes the spare bandwidth of the interdomain link.
Layer-two defense: In this experiment, although all senders
are adopting TCP, 6 of them deviate from TCP’s congestion
control algorithm by continuously injecting packets in face of
congestive losses. As illustrated in Fig. 5(b), malicious senders
successfully exhaust the interdomain bandwidth without the
protection of Umbrella. At t = 4s, Umbrella starts to police
traffic based on its rate limiting algorithm. As attackers fail to
comply with Umbrella’s rate limiting, their bandwidth shares
are significantly reduced, resulting in almost zero share in the
steady state. However, legitimate clients’ throughput gradually
converges to their traffic demand.
Layer-three defense: In this experiment, one sender is up-
graded to represent premium clients with 200Mbps bandwidth
guarantee. Another sender stands for common clients with
500Mbps traffic demand. The rest senders emulate attackers
transmitting malicious TCP flows. To satisfy the guarantee,
the victim configures the normalized queue weight as 0.2, 0.7
and 0.1 for premium clients, common clients and UDP traffic,
respectively. Fig. 5(c) demonstrates that premium clients’
bandwidth share is guaranteed throughout the experiment,
saving them from the turbulence caused by DDoS attacks.
Further, common clients are protected after Umbrella enables
its rate limiting, which effectively thwarts DDoS attacks.
C. Mitigating Large Scale DDoS Attacks
In this section, we evaluate Umbrella’s defense against large
scale DDoS attacks. In the evaluation, we develop a flow-
level simulator rather than completely relying on the existing
packet-level emulators or simulators (e.g., Mininet [36], ns-
3 [23]) because it takes them prohibitively long to emulate
large scale DDoS attacks. Specifically, assume that a packet-
level simulator can process one million packets per second and
that one million attack flows, each sending at 5Mbps, attack a
10Gbps link. Even if we set the packet size as the maximum
allowed size 1.5KB, it will take the simulator around 140
hours to simulate just one second of the attack. By concealing
the detailed per-packet processing and focusing on per-flow
behaviors, our flow-level simulator is still able to accurately
evaluate Umbrella, which in fact relies on flow-level states
to police traffic. However, we also perform a moderate scale
simulation on ns-3 to benchmark our flow-level simulator.
The network topology adopted in simulations is similar to
that of the testbed experiments except the number of senders
can be more than 1 million and we scale up the interdomain
bandwidth to 10Gbps. Unless otherwise stated, the following
experiments are performed on our flow-level simulator.
8 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 0  5  10  15  20  25
Start
policing Weighted fair sharing
B
a
n
d
w
id
th
 (
M
b
p
s
)
Traffic policing time (s)
Legitimate clients
Attackers
(a) Layer one defense.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45
Start policing Throughput converges
Attacks stopped
B
a
n
d
w
id
th
 (
M
b
p
s
)
Traffic policing time (s)
Legitimate clients
Attackers
(b) Layer two defense.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
Attacks started
Attacks stopped
B
a
n
d
w
id
th
 (
M
b
p
s
)
Traffic policing time (s)
Preimum clients
Common clients
Attackers
(c) Layer two and three defense.
Fig. 5: Testbed experiments.
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Fig. 6: Mitigating large scale DDoS attacks.
We design experiments for different strategies attackers may
take: (i) they launch on-off shrew attacks [24] to evade detec-
tion, (ii) vary the volume of attack traffic and (iii) dynamically
adjust their rates based on packet losses. In the on-off attack,
attackers coordinate with each other to send high traffic bursts
during on periods and stay inactive during off periods. We
use the ratio of the off-period’s length to the on-period’s
length (denoted by Roffon ) to represent attackers’ strategy in
the on-off attack. In the second strategic attack, we define
the aggressiveness factor Af as the ratio of the total volume
of attack traffic to the interdomain bandwidth. Attackers may
vary the Af during attacks. In the first two experiments,
attackers disrespect packet losses and keep injecting packets
in case of severe congestive losses. The design of these two
experiments is to prove that when attackers fail to adopt the
optimal strategy (the third strategy discussed below), Umbrella
accurately throttles attack flows so that legitimate senders
receive more bandwidth than their guaranteed portions. In
the third strategy (the optimal one), attackers rely on their
transport protocols to probe packet losses so as to adjust their
rates to honor the congestion. In this case, we demonstrate that
Umbrella guarantees per-sender fairness for legitimate senders.
In the first strategic attack, we set the length of the on-period
the same as Dp (5s) and vary the ratio Roffon from 0 to 18.
Meanwhile we set the number of legitimate clients NL=100K
and vary the number of attackers from 100K to 1 million.
Further, we set Af=2 but varying the rate of each attacker
based on a Gaussian distribution.5 The experimental results,
5Assume the aggregated rate of attackers is R, then the Gaussian distribu-
tion’s mean is R/NA and the standardization is 1.
illustrated in Fig. 6(a), show that legitimate users can obtain
more bandwidth than the per-sender fair share regardless of
Roffon ’s value and the attack scale. This is because Umbrella’s
rate limiting algorithm incorporates flows’ previous packet
losses while making rate limiting decisions. Consequently,
even completely staying inactive during off-periods, attackers
fail to save their reputation by the strategic on-off attack.
Further, Umbrella can effectively distinguish misbehaved flows
from legitimate ones no matter how many misbehaved flows
are involving. Ironically, larger attack scales result in higher
benefit gains for legitimate users in the sense that their
bandwidth shares are boosted to higher levels compared with
the per-sender fair share. In all scenarios, attackers’ bandwidth
shares are limited to almost zero.
In the second strategic attack, we vary Af from 0.9 to
4. Although setting Af<1 cannot completely disconnect the
victim from its ISP, attackers can throttle legitimate users to a
tiny fraction of the total bandwidth by aggressively injecting
packets (image an analogical situation where a 900Mbps UDP
flow competes with TCP flows on a 1Gbps link). Attackers
experience low packet loss rates as legitimate users cut their
rates dramatically. To defend against such “moderate” attacks,
the victim can configure Umbrella to start traffic policing when
the link utilization exceeds a pre-defined threshold (e.g., 90%).
We fix NL=100K and NA=500K in this experiment. The
results (Fig. 6(b)) show that legitimate users get at least the
per-sender fair share in all settings. Note that in moderate
attacks, attackers can prevent their bandwidth shares from
being further reduced by extending the off-period, resulting
in per-sender fairness. However, increasing Af actually puts
9attackers in a bad situation that their flows are blocked.
The previous two experiments prove that when attackers
fail to comply with Umbrella’s rate limiting, their bandwidth
shares are significantly reduced. Legitimate users may there-
fore obtain more bandwidth than the per-sender fair share. In
the third strategy, attackers actively adjust their rates based
on packet losses so as to maintain low packet loss rates.
Besides our flow-level simulator, we also adopt the ns-3 [23]
in this setting. To circumvent ns-3’s scalability problem, we
adopt the similar approach used in NetFence [9]. Specifically,
we fix the number of nodes (500 attackers and 50 legitimate
nodes in our experiments) and scale down the link capacity to
simulate the large scale attacks. By varying the link bandwidth
from 5Mbps to 50Mbps, we are able to simulate the attack
scenarios where 100K to 1 million attackers try to flood the
10Gbps interdomain link. We use the ns-3.21 version and
add Umbrella’s rate limiting logic to the PointToPointNetDe-
vice module, which performs flow analysis upon receiving
packets. To execute their optimal strategy, attackers have to
rely on TCP-like protocols to probe the network condition
and determine their rates accordingly. We test all supported
TCP congestion control algorithms in ns-3: Tahoe, Reno, and
NewReno. Legitimate clients are adopting the NewReno.
The results (Fig. 6(c)) show that complying with Umbrella’s
rate limiting grants attackers the per-sender fairness (results
for different TCP protocols in ns-3 are very close and we
plot the results for the NewReno). As stated in Lemma 1,
the hypothetical strategy for attackers, assuming that they are
able to know their exact allowed rates and control remote
packet losses, produces an unreachable upper bound for their
bandwidth shares. Further, our flow-level simulator and the
packet-level ns-3 simulator share (almost) the same results.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss related work that has inspired
the design of Umbrella. Generally speaking, we categorize
the previous DDoS defense approaches into two major schools
(i.e., filtering-based and capability-based approaches), whereas
there are other approaches built on different defense primitives.
Filtering-based systems (e.g., IP Traceback [1], [2],
AITF [3], Pushback [4], [5], StopIt [6]) stop DDoS attacks
by filtering attack flows. Thus they need to distinguish attack
flows from legitimate ones. For instance, IP Traceback uses
a packet marking algorithm to construct the path that carries
attack flows so as to block them. AITF aggregates all traffic
traversing the same series of ASs as one Flow and blocks
such flows if the victim suspects attacks. Pushback informs
upstream routers to block certain type of traffic. StopIt assumes
the victim can identify the attack flows. However, filtering-
based systems often require remote ASs to block attack traffic
on the victim’s behalf, which is difficult to enforce in the
Internet. Further, these systems may falsely block legitimate
flows since the method used to distinguish attack flows could
have a high false positive rate.
The capability-based systems, such as SIFF [7] and
TVA [8], try to suppress attack traffic by only accepting
packets carrying valid capabilities. The original design is
vulnerable to the DoC attack [37], which can be mitigated
by the Portcullis protocol [38]. NetFence [9] is proposed to
achieve network-wide per-sender fairness based on capabili-
ties. However, these approaches assume universal capability
deployment. CRAFT [39] and Mirage [18] are proposed
towards real-world deployment. CRAFT emulates TCP states
for all traversing flows so that no one can obtain a greater share
than what TCP allows. However, CRAFT requires upgrades of
both the Internet core and end-hosts. Mirage [18], a puzzle-
based solution, needs to be incorporated into IPv6 deployment.
The state-of-the-art in this category MiddlePolice [10] is
readily deployable in the current Internet. However, it still
relies on cloud infrastructure to police traffic, which may be
privacy-invasive for some organizations.
Other DDoS defense solutions, besides the above two cat-
egories, include SpeakUp [17], Phalanx [11], SOS [12] and
few future Internet architecture proposals like XIA [16] and
SCION [14]. SpeakUp allows legitimate senders to increase
their rates to compete with attackers. Such an approach is
effective when the bottleneck happens at the application layer
so that legitimate users can get more requests processed given
all their requests can be delivered. In the case where network is
the bottleneck, SpeakUp may potentially congest the network.
Phalanx and SOS propose to use large scale overlay networks
to defend DDoS attacks. XIA and SCION focus on building
the clean-slate Internet architecture so as to enhance Internet
security, e.g., enforcing accountability [15].
In contrast to these prior work, Umbrella is motivated to
address a real-world threat and achieves two critical features
(i.e., deployability and privacy-preserving) towards this end.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper presents the design, implementation and evalu-
ation of Umbrella, a new DDoS defense mechanism enabling
ISPs to offer readily deployable and privacy-preserving DDoS
prevention services. To provide effective DDoS prevention,
Umbrella merely requires independent deployment at the vic-
tim’s ISP and no Internet core or end-hosts upgrades, making
Umbrella immediately deployable. Further, Umbrella does not
require the ISP to terminate victim’s application connections,
allowing the ISP to operate at network layer as usual. In its
design, Umbrella’s multi-layered defense allows Umbrella to
stop various DDoS attacks and provides both guaranteed and
elastic bandwidth shares for legitimate clients. Based on the
prototype implementation, we demonstrate that Umbrella is
scalable to deal with large scale DDoS attacks involving mil-
lions of attackers and introduces negligible packet processing
overhead. Finally, our physical testbed experiments and large
scale simulations prove that Umbrella is effective to mitigate
various strategic DDoS attacks.
We envision two major followup directions of this work
in the near future. First, the user-specific layer in Umbrella
enables a potential DDoS victim to enforce self-desired traffic
control policies during DDoS mitigation. However, one chal-
lenge is how to guide the victim to develop reasonable policies
that are most suitable for its business logic. This is because
proposing valid policies may require profound understanding
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of the victim’s network traffic, which typically depends on
comprehensive traffic monitoring and analysis. Unfortunately,
the potential victim may lack such capability in this regard.
Thus, designing and implementing various machine learning
based traffic discovery tools is part of our future work. The
second potential research direction is to enable smart payment
between ISPs and potential victims. The high level goal is
to ensure that ISPs and victims can unambiguously agree on
certain filtering services so that the ISPs are paid properly on
each attack packet it filters and meanwhile a potential victim
can reclaim its payment back if an ISP fails to stop attacks. We
propose to design a smart-contract based system in this regard,
relying on the “non-stoppable” features of smart contracts. Our
initial proposal is under review.
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